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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
MATTHEW H. BOWERS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44335
NEZ PERCE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-1629

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury found Matthew H. Bowers guilty of seven counts of lewd conduct with
a minor, the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment, with
fifteen years fixed. Mr. Bowers timely appealed and challenges the district court’s
sentence as excessive.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed an Information charging Mr. Bowers with eight counts of lewd
conduct with a minor, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508. (R., pp.122–24.) The alleged victims
were Mr. Bowers’s two daughters, M.A.B. and A.M.B. (See Conf. Exs., Presentence
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Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.2–4.) The conduct allegedly began with M.A.B. in 2012
when she was twelve or thirteen and with A.M.B. in 2013 when she was eleven or
twelve. (R., pp.122–24.)
Mr. Bowers pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. (R., p.140.) At trial, Mr. Bowers
testified in his defense. (Tr.,1 p.573, L.17–p.585, L.18.) He denied any sexual contact
with M.A.B. or A.M.B. (Tr., p.574, Ls.13–18, p.580, Ls.21–23.) In addition, Mr. Bowers’s
long-time girlfriend, the girlfriend’s daughter, Mr. Bowers’s stepfather, and a family
friend (who lived with the Bowers) all testified that they never observed or heard of any
inappropriate sexual contact between Mr. Bowers and A.M.B. or M.A.B. (Tr., p.481,
Ls.2–10, p.499, Ls.9–12, p.544, Ls.4–9, p.570, Ls.10–16.) The jury found Mr. Bowers
guilty of seven of the eight counts. (R., pp.261–62.)
At sentencing,2 the State recommended an aggregate sentence of life
imprisonment, with twenty-five years fixed. (Tr., p.669, Ls.1–2.) Mr. Bowers asked the
district court consider a length of sentence that would allow M.A.B. and A.M.B. “to reach
the age of majority before Mr. Bowers would become eligible for parole,” which would
ensure they would be “old enough to take care of themselves” and “no longer be in a
home where Mr. Bowers would have any access to them and would not be at risk.”
(Tr., p.667, Ls.14–24.) The district court sentenced Mr. Bowers to life imprisonment,
with fifteen years fixed, for each count, to be served concurrently. (Tr. p.679, Ls.8–13.)
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There is only one transcript on appeal. It contains jury trial, held April 4 to April 6,
2016, and the sentencing hearing, held on June 30, 2016.
2
Prior to sentencing, the State submitted a psychosexual evaluation (“PSE”) based on
the police reports and other similar information. (R., p.309; Conf. Exs., PSE, pp.92–111)
Because Mr. Bowers had waived a PSE, the district court granted Mr. Bowers’s motion
to strike the PSE offered by the State. (R., pp.309, 319.)
2

Mr. Bowers timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.324–26, 333–35.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of life
imprisonment, with fifteen years fixed, upon Mr. Bowers, following his conviction for
seven counts of lewd conduct?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of
Life Imprisonment, With Fifteen Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Bowers, Following His
Conviction For Seven Counts Of Lewd Conduct
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Bowers’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-1508 (maximum of life
imprisonment). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable,
Mr. Bowers “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Bowers asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends
the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of
the mitigating factors, including his minor criminal history, successful employment
history, low risk of recidivism, and family support.
The lack of a serious criminal record supports a lesser sentence for Mr. Bowers.
“The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.” State v.
Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.’” State v.
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982)). Here, as indicated in the PSI, Mr. Bowers’s criminal
record reflects a number of misdemeanor offenses, but these offenses all occurred in
the early 2000s. (Conf. Exs., PSI, pp.5–8.) The last misdemeanor offense occurred in
2004. (Conf. Exs., PSI, pp.8.) Mr. Bowers submits the district court failed to give
adequate consideration to his minor criminal history and imposed an excessive
sentence under the circumstances.
Along with the minimal criminal history, Mr. Bowers maintained steady
employment. See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful
employment as a mitigating factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95
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(Ct. App. 1982) (employment and desire to advance within company were mitigating
circumstances). Mr. Bowers owns the Second Chance Thrift Shop in Lewiston. (Conf.
Exs., PSI, p.22.) His family continues to run the business while he is incarcerated.
(Conf. Exs., PSI, p.22.) In addition to owning a business, Mr. Bowers worked as the
assistant manager of a Stinker Store in Lewiston for two years. (Conf. Exs., PSI, p.22.)
His employer described his employment as “on time, reliable, completed his work daily
and had a good attitude.” (Conf. Exs., PSI, p.22.) The only reason Mr. Bowers was laid
off from this job was due to the conflict between his legal issues and Stinker Store work
schedule. (Conf. Exs., PSI, p.22.) Mr. Bowers asserts his positive employment history
supports a lesser sentence.
Turning to the protection of society, there is a low risk Mr. Bowers will reoffend. A
report from a licensed psychologist explains that the rate of recidivism for offenders who
commit sex offenses against family members is lower than other sex offenses. (Conf.
Exs., p.113.) The rate of recidivism for offenders like Mr. Bowers is six percent in five
years and thirteen percent in fifteen years. (Conf. Exs., p.113.) Further, although
Mr. Bowers maintains his innocence, Mr. Bowers stated he will comply with any order
for treatment or supervision. (Conf. Exs., PSI, p.28.) This information demonstrates a
lengthy term of incarceration is excessive—Mr. Bowers is willing to engage in treatment
and has a low risk of recidivism. The objectives of criminal punishment can be achieved
through a lesser sentence than life imprisonment, with fifteen years fixed.
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Finally, Mr. Bowers has immense support from his family and friends. (Exs.,3
pp.64–114.) While most of the letters of support from his family and friends maintain
Mr. Bowers’s innocence, they also demonstrate his good character and their willingness
to support him. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family support and good character as
mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court
considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). For example,
Mr. Bowers’s stepson wrote that Mr. Bowers was “more of a father than my own dad”
and he “gave us computers, shelter, food, and clothing.” (Exs., Brandon Snell Letter,
p.64.) Similarly, Mr. Bowers’s stepdaughter wrote that Mr. Bowers always made sure
they were fed and had a roof over their heads. (Exs., Jaimie Snell Letter, p.76.) She
described Mr. Bowers as the person that held the family together. (Exs., Jaimie Snell
Letter, p.76.) Mr. Bowers’s mother described him as caring, kind, and always there
when someone needs help. (Exs., Debra Bernier Letter, p.69.) In addition, Mr. Bowers’s
sister wrote that she trusted Mr. Bowers and that he would do anything to help another
person. (Exs., Kirsten Keith Letter, p.91.) Many friends stated Mr. Bowers was friendly,
honest, helpful, and trustworthy. (Exs., Joe Ward Letter, p.79, Mary Butler Letter,
pp.93–94, Rick Semmes Letter, pp.108–10, Susan Lougee Letter, p.112, Vicky
Fountain Letter, p.113.) These letters indicate Mr. Bowers would have an excellent
support system in the community upon release and thus stand in favor of a lesser term
of imprisonment.

3

These letters of support were included as part of the exhibits to the Clerk’s Record, not
as part of the confidential exhibits.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Bowers respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the
district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 17th day of February, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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